Translate this page into:
Does the Cost of Capital Mediate the Link Between Sustainability Commitment and Innovation Intensity? Dynamic Evidence from Saudi-Listed Companies
*Corresponding author: Dr. Ahmed Kouki, Department of Accounting, College of Business and Economics, Qassim University, P.O. Box: 6640, Buraidah, 51452, Saudi Arabia. koukiahmed10@gmail.com, a.kouki@qu.edu.sa
-
Received: ,
Accepted: ,
How to cite this article: Alenezi SM, Kouki A. Does the Cost of Capital Mediate the Link Between Sustainability Commitment and Innovation Intensity? Dynamic Evidence from Saudi-Listed Companies. J Adm Econ Sci. doi: 10.25259/JAES_8_2025
Abstract
Objectives
This paper examines the triangular relationship between ESG engagement, the cost of capital, and innovation intensity, specifically whether the cost of capital mediates the link between a firm’s sustainability commitment and its innovation activities.
Material and Methods
To ensure robust estimates in a dynamic panel setting, we employ a two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator. We analyse a panel of 58 non-financial Saudi firms from 2016 to 2024, a period covering the launch and implementation of the ‘Vision 2030’ reforms.
Results
Higher ESG commitment lowers the cost of capital, which limits R&D investment; additionally, ESG engagement directly boosts innovation, confirming the expected bilateral relationship. This study primarily rejects the financial mediation hypothesis, finding that ESG’s indirect effect on innovation via capital costs is insignificant, while the direct strategic effect dominates.
Conclusions
In an institutional high-pressure environment, sustainable innovation is driven more by legitimacy and survival needs than by lower financing costs. Our findings challenge the idea that ESG’s value for innovation is about easing financial constraints; instead, it helps develop capabilities to address external pressures.
Keywords
Cost of capital
GMM system
Innovation
Sustainability
Vision 2030
G32
Q31
Q32

1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, corporate sustainability, defined by environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria, has shifted from a minor ethical issue to a central strategic focus.1 Confronted with the climate crisis, societal demands, and strict regulations, companies are now judged not only on their financial results but also on their ability to generate shared value for all stakeholders.2,3 This shift has led to the idea that a genuine ESG commitment could provide a “double dividend”: one financial, through better access to capital, and one strategic, through increased innovation capacity.
In finance, there’s a consensus that high ESG commitment signals strong management and proactive risk handling.4,5 Sustainable companies reduce information gaps and boost investor confidence, lowering their risk premium and cost of capital. Many studies confirm this negative link for both equity6-10 and debt. This risk mitigation view dominates theory, overshadowing the overinvestment hypothesis from agency theory, which sees ESG spending as an agency cost penalised by markets.11,12 Recent research shows that markets incorporate risks such as carbon, extreme weather, and climate politics13-15 into equity valuation. Environmental disclosures, whether mandatory16 or voluntary,17 are rewarded by investors.
A second research branch in strategic management highlights sustainability’s benefits, viewing environmental and social pressures as creative shocks that foster innovation.18 Companies aim to reduce their carbon footprint, optimise resources, or create ethical products, which encourages eco-innovation.19,20 Supported by models like resource-based view (RBV) and dynamic capabilities, ESG engagement helps develop unique skills, offering a sustainable competitive edge.21,22 Recent research shows that sustainability boosts innovation along supply chains,23 promotes green innovation in polluting firms,24 and drives sector performance, such as in the blue economy.25
Our research focuses on Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation, particularly with the launch of Vision 2030 in 2016, which aims to diversify beyond hydrocarbons, promote a knowledge-based economy, and prioritise sustainability.26 This creates an environment where institutional pressures push firms toward sustainability and innovation, with initiatives like the Saudi Green Initiative, ESG reporting guidelines, and public investment funds (PIFs) green finance role shaping an environment where ESG alignment is key to legitimacy and capital access; Reuters 2024.27-31 This framework provides an opportunity to study how Saudi companies balance sustainability, financing, and innovation.
While literature confirms bilateral links between ESG and the cost of capital and innovation, the triangular dynamics remain unclear. The assumption is that the cost of capital mediates: ESG engagement enables cheaper financing, freeing resources for long-term innovation.32,33 The financial channel is seen as the primary catalyst. However, this causal chain, although attractive, has been very rarely tested in an integrated manner. As several literature reviews highlight, there is a distinct lack of studies combining these three variables within a unified model to empirically test this mediation mechanism.18,34 This empirical gap is particularly pronounced in emerging markets, where institutional dynamics and financing structures may differ from those in developed economies.
This paper aims to deconstruct how ESG engagement influences innovation. The key question is whether ESG impacts innovation primarily through financial benefits, such as reduced capital costs, or through a direct strategic channel involving new skills and stakeholder pressures. If financial channels dominate, green finance and transparency are vital; if strategic, innovation responds mainly to regulatory and market needs, with ESG having a negligible effect. The main issue is whether sustainability is crucial for Saudi firms. This paper evaluates how sustainability commitment affects the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for non-financial listed companies in the Saudi stock exchange from 2016 to 2024. It also investigates how WACC affects innovation, as measured by R&D expenses, and examines the direct link between ESG engagement and innovation to identify strategic channels. The study tests whether the cost of capital mediates the ESG-innovation link using a structural equation model, distinguishing financial from strategic effects.
This study makes key contributions intersecting sustainable finance, strategy, and innovation. Its main theoretical impact challenges the idea that ESG creates value primarily through financial channels, instead showing that direct strategic interplay is more influential, especially under institutional pressure. This prompts a reassessment of the links between finance and sustainable strategy and extends theories such as RBV and dynamic capabilities by highlighting ESG as a catalyst for organisational capabilities. Empirically, it is the first to test the ESG–cost of capital-innovation link using system GMM, controlling for endogeneity issues that previous studies overlooked, thus strengthening the validity of findings on the lack of mediation. Focusing on Saudi firms during Vision 2030 offers rare insights into an emerging market undergoing significant structural change. This approach broadens ESG research beyond Europe and North America, revealing how state-led economic shifts influence corporate sustainability and innovation strategies.
2. INTEGRATED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. The financial channel: Sustainability as a risk reduction tool
The first channel suggests that a company’s ESG commitment provides a tangible financial advantage, specifically by lowering its cost of capital. Several overlapping theories explain this process. Stakeholder2 and legitimacy35 theories state that a company that successfully manages its relationships with all its stakeholders (employees, customers, communities, regulators) and aligns its actions with societal norms enhances its license to operate. This legitimacy reduces non-financial risks, such as regulatory, reputational, and operational risks, thereby stabilising future cash flows and lowering the risk premium investors require.36,37
Signalling theory5 complements this view by asserting that the disclosure of high-quality ESG information reduces information asymmetry between managers and capital providers.4 By signalling proactive management and a long-term vision, the company strengthens investor confidence, which makes investors willing to accept a lower return for a perceived lower level of risk.7 Finally, this mechanism is part of the debate raised by agency theory.12 While the “overinvestment” hypothesis suggests that ESG spending may be an agency cost penalised by markets,11 the now dominant “risk mitigation” perspective views ESG engagement as a prudent investment that protects long-term shareholder value.38 Together, these theories predict that credible ESG performance is rewarded with a lower cost of capital.
A body of literature shows a negative relationship between a firm’s environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance and its cost of capital.39 The prevailing logic, derived from stakeholder, legitimacy, and signalling theories, is that ESG engagement acts as a powerful de-risking mechanism. By proactively managing non-financial risks (regulatory, reputational, climate) and improving transparency, sustainable firms reduce information asymmetry and strengthen investor confidence, thereby requiring a lower risk premium.
Recent empirical studies confirm this link, showing that high ESG scores are associated with lower costs of equity and debt.7,10,40 Recent studies refine this conclusion by showing that financial markets integrate specific factors such as carbon risk,13 environmental disclosure policies 16, or voluntary green certifications17 into the assessment of the cost of capital. Although some studies highlight contextual nuances, such as market maturity or governance quality,41,42 the general trend confirms that ESG engagement is financially rewarded. In the Saudi context, where institutional investors are paying increasing attention to ESG transparency,43 we expect this mechanism to be at work as well. This leads us to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A more substantial sustainability commitment is associated with a lower cost of capital.
2.2. Cost of capital and innovation: The financial constraints channel
The corporate finance literature clearly establishes that the cost of capital is a constraint on innovation. Innovation, as measured by R&D expenditure, is a long-term investment inherently risky and has uncertain returns. The cost of capital serves as a “hurdle rate” for such projects. A high cost of capital makes it more challenging to reach the break-even point for R&D projects, discouraging managers from undertaking them and favoring shorter-term investments.32,33
Empirical studies confirm that financial frictions hamper R&D investment44 and that, conversely, a lower cost of equity is associated with greater innovation efforts.45 An interesting nuance is provided by Peia and Romelli,46 who show that a moderate increase in the cost of capital can encourage firms to allocate their resources more efficiently by protecting the most strategic R&D projects. Nevertheless, the consensus remains that a structurally high cost of capital remains a significant obstacle to a sustained innovation effort. We therefore formulate our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): A higher cost of capital is negatively related to firms’ innovation intensity.
2.3. ESG engagement and innovation: The strategic-capability channel
The second channel, strategic in nature, posits that ESG engagement directly enhances the firm’s innovation capacity, independent of any financial advantage. This link is primarily explained by the RBV and the concept of dynamic capabilities. According to the RBV, a sustainable competitive advantage stems from the possession of rare, valuable, and difficult-to-imitate resources.47 ESG engagement specifically compels firms to develop resources, whether intangible assets like a responsible brand reputation or new organisational skills, such as mastery of eco-design or management of circular supply chains.21
The dynamic capabilities framework goes further by defining a firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure its competencies to respond to a rapidly changing environment.22 ESG pressures (regulatory, competitive, societal) act as “creative shocks” that force firms to develop sustainability-specific dynamic capabilities: the ability to detect opportunities and threats related to sustainable development, to seize these opportunities by mobilising resources for green innovation, and to reconfigure business models and processes to align with a low-carbon economy.48 This process of continuous adaptation is innovation. Finally, organisational learning theories emphasise that ESG engagement fosters a culture of collaboration and knowledge sharing, creating fertile ground for responsible initiatives to transform into creative solutions.
Regardless of the financial channel, a growing literature argues that ESG engagement acts as a direct catalyst for innovation. According to this perspective, often associated with the “Porter hypothesis,” environmental constraints and social expectations act as “creative shocks” that push firms to develop new products, processes, and business models, a phenomenon known as eco-innovation.18
This link is explained by the development of new organisational competencies, as suggested by the RBV and dynamic capabilities. By addressing ESG challenges, firms acquire unique know-how and strengthen their ability to adapt to a changing environment.21,22 Recent empirical studies confirm that ESG engagement stimulates green innovation within polluting firms,24 promotes the development of sustainable business models,19 and drives performance in specific sectors, such as the blue economy.25 This direct effect leads us to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): A stronger sustainability commitment positively influences firms’ innovation capacity.
2.4. Channel interplay and the role of institutional pressure: The empirical gap
These two channels do not operate in isolation. Institutional theory49 provides a unifying framework by highlighting how external pressures (coercive, normative, and mimetic) simultaneously shape firms’ financial and innovation strategies. In a context like Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 exerts top-down institutional pressure, incentivising firms to adopt ESG practices to maintain their legitimacy and market access. This same pressure pushes them to innovate, comply with new regulations, and seize opportunities in green markets.
This integrated framework leads us to the central question of this research. If ESG engagement reduces the cost of capital (financial channel) and a lower cost of capital facilitates innovation by lowering the required rate of return for R&D projects,32,33 it is logical to postulate that the cost of capital acts as a mediator. However, the relative strength of this indirect financial channel compared to the direct strategic channel remains an open empirical question. Our study aims precisely to separate these two mechanisms to determine whether sustainability is primarily a source of financing for innovation or an innovation imperative.
Although these pairwise links are well established, prior studies rarely test the whole chain, ESG → cost of capital → innovation in an integrated framework.18,34 The most natural, yet under-tested, inference is that financial de-risking is a mediating mechanism: ESG lowers the cost of capital, and cheaper capital enables R&D. At the same time, recent work suggests asymmetric pricing across capital markets; equity investors often react more strongly to ESG than creditors, implying that any mediation may be uneven across cost of equity versus cost of debt.13,39 Testing mediation in a policy-active emerging market such as Saudi Arabia is therefore essential.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The cost of capital mediates the relationship between sustainability commitment and innovation.
Figure 1 summarises the research and the conceptual model.

3. MATERIAL AND METHODS
3.1. Sample and data
Our empirical analysis examines a sample of firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) from 2016 to 2024. We acknowledge that the Saudi Vision 2030 was officially inaugurated in April 2016. However, we have retained the full year of 2016 in our analysis for two critical theoretical and econometric reasons. First, based on signalling theory, capital markets are forward-looking; the announcement of such a significant regime shift triggers immediate anticipatory adjustments in risk premiums and corporate strategies, making 2016 a pivotal year for capturing the market’s initial reaction. Second, regarding econometric specification, the System GMM estimator is data-intensive and relies on lagged values (t-1, t-2) as internal instruments. Excluding 2016 would reduce the time series (T) to 8 years, significantly weakening the instrument set and the power of the Sargan-Hansen overidentification tests. Furthermore, including year fixed effects in our model absorbs any transitional volatility or aggregate shocks specific to the 2016 launch period, ensuring that our coefficient estimates remain unbiased. In line with standard practice, we excluded financial firms due to their unique balance sheets and regulatory frameworks. After removing observations with missing data, our final sample comprises a balanced panel of 58 non-financial firms tracked over nine years, totalling 522 firm-year observations. The sample composition, primarily consisting of basic materials (36.21%) and energy (8.62%), reflects Saudi Arabia’s historical economy. This isn’t bias but a core issue, as Vision 2030 aims to diversify and make these sectors sustainable and innovative. Financial, governance, and ESG data are sourced from the Refinitiv/London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) database, a leading global market data source. The sample selection is shown in Table 1.
| Sample selection | Number of firms | Observations |
|---|---|---|
| Number of observations in the initial sample during the sampling period 2016–2024: | 365 | 3285 |
| Less | ||
| Financials, real estate, and academic & educational services | 97 | 873 |
| Observations with missing data related to ESG and/or R&D expenditures and governance factors | 210 | 1890 |
| Final sample | 58 | 522 |
| Sector | Number of firms | Perc. in Sample (%) |
| Basic materials | 21 | 36.21 |
| Cyclical consumer | 8 | 13.79 |
| Non-cyclical consumer | 7 | 12.07 |
| Energy | 5 | 8.62 |
| Technology | 5 | 8.62 |
| Healthcare | 4 | 6.90 |
| Industry | 4 | 6.90 |
| Utilities | 4 | 6.90 |
| Total | 58 | 100.00 |
ESG: Environmental, social, and governance.
Notes: The sample consists of 58 non-financial companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) for the period 2016-2024. Data are sourced from Refinitiv LSEG. Sector classification is based on the Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC) sector.
3.2. Operationalisation of variables
Dependent variable: Innovation intensity
We measure firms’ innovation efforts using the natural logarithm of annual research and development (R&D) expenditures as an indicator of innovation intensity. R&D expenditure is a standard proxy for innovation in accounting and finance because it reflects resources used to develop new products, processes, or services and is supported by consistent data. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) policy analyses show that R&D investments are systematically recorded, and higher R&D spending is linked to better innovation performance and economic output. Log transformation reduces the skewness and heteroscedasticity in financial data. Though it doesn’t always eliminate skewness, it improves comparability among firms and the properties of regression residuals.
We acknowledge that our reliance on R&D expenditure as a proxy for innovation represents a limitation, as it measures innovation input (effort) rather than output (efficiency or success, such as patents). In the Saudi market, which is dominated by resource-intensive sectors such as basic materials and energy, R&D spending remains the most consistent and comparable metric for gauging corporate commitment to strategic renewal. However, this focus may not fully capture process innovations or non-technological improvements. Future research could benefit from incorporating output-based metrics, such as patent counts or new product revenue, to validate the efficiency of the strategic channel identified in this study.
Independent variable: Sustainable engagement
We measure sustainable engagement via Refinitiv’s ESG score, which assesses over 12,000 companies in 76 countries using 600+ metrics across ten categories, three pillars (Environmental, Social, Governance), and an overall rating. It uses industry-specific weights for environmental and social factors and a consistent weight for governance, producing percentile rankings from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating better ESG performance. LSEG states that these scores fairly reflect a company’s ESG efforts based on publicly reported data, ranging from 0 to 100 and including letter grades. The primary ESG scores focus on proactive sustainability, with companies involved in controversies scoring lower (ESGC).
Mediating variable: Cost of capital
The cost of capital, as reflected in WACC, is the rate a firm pays to finance its assets, calculated as a weighted average of debt and equity based on market values. WACC represents the opportunity cost of raising funds and is used as a discount rate in net present value (NPV) calculations. A higher WACC indicates higher expected returns; a lower WACC suggests easier financing. We use firm-level WACC from Refinitiv, calculated with current market rates, risk premiums, and tax shields, aligning with our view that financing costs affect investment and innovation.
Control variables
To examine relationships, we include standard control variables from corporate finance and governance: firm size (log of market capitalisation), financial leverage, board size, gender diversity, CEO presence, and CEO duality. Year fixed effects are included to account for macroeconomic shocks.
3.3. Econometric strategy and model specification
Estimating a firm’s sustainability impact on innovation involves key econometric challenges. Three issues arise. First, dynamic endogeneity, or Nickell bias,50 occurs because innovation decisions are persistent, with current R&D depending on past spending. Including the lagged dependent variable causes correlation with the error term, biasing results, especially in short panels (T=9). Second, simultaneity or reverse causality exists; lower capital costs can boost innovation, but highly innovative firms may be perceived as less risky, lowering their capital costs. Third, omitted-variable bias arises from unobservable traits such as management, culture, or tech opportunities that affect ESG, capital, and innovation; ignoring these leads to biased estimates.
To address these challenges, we use the two-step System GMM estimator for dynamic panel data, developed by Arellano and Bover51 and Blundell and Bond.52 It outperforms the earlier Difference GMM estimator53 when variables are highly persistent, as is the case with R&D expenditures. Lagged levels become weak instruments for the first-differenced equation. Still, System GMM fixes this by combining the differenced equation (instrumented with lagged levels) with an equation in levels (instrumented with lagged differences).
To ensure our GMM’s robustness and credibility, we follow best practices from the literature. We use the efficient two-step estimator and apply Windmeijer’s54 correction to standard errors to fix bias in small samples. To avoid ‘instrument proliferation,’ which can overfit and weaken tests, we use Roodman’s55,56 collapse option, collapsing one instrument per lag across all periods. Following this approach, we define the three dynamic panel models below to examine our hypotheses:
We estimate the following three dynamic models to test our hypotheses:
Model 1 (H1): Factors influencing the cost of capital
where denotes control variables. We expect : better ESG performance should reduce the cost of capital.
Model 2 (H2): Impact of the cost of capital on innovation
We expect : higher financing costs reduce R&D spending.
Model 3 (H3): direct impact of sustainability on innovation
Here we expect : stronger ESG performance may directly enhance innovation.
Where and index the firm and the year, respectively. The term represents firm-specific fixed effects that are removed by first-differencing in the GMM estimation. The term captures year fixed effects (standard shocks across firms). We employ the Arellano–Bond estimator, which requires that there be no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors.
All three models use the Arellano–Bond test to detect second-order serial correlation in the residuals, rejecting the null if it is present. Sargan/Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions are also reported: the Sargan57 statistic (after one-step GMM) checks if instruments are uncorrelated with the error, following a chi-square distribution. The Hansen58 statistic (after two-step GMM) offers a robust alternative under heteroskedasticity. Not rejecting these tests supports the validity of the instrument set, confirming proper model specification and reliable results.
While our conceptual framework aligns with the logic of the causal steps outlined by Baron and Kenny,59 we employ structural equation modelling (SEM) to estimate the mediation effects statistically. Recent methodological literature suggests that simultaneous estimation via SEM offers superior statistical power compared to the sequential causal steps approach, particularly when quantifying indirect effects. Consequently, we utilise SEM to rigorously test the significance of the indirect path from ESG to Innovation via the Cost of Capital (H4).
4. RESULTS
4.1. Descriptive statistics and preliminary analysis
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for 522 firm-year observations of 58 Saudi non-financial firms (2016–2024). ESG scores are widely spread mean 27.63, SD 16.82, ranging from 0.85 to 84.24. This shows uneven sustainability practices, with some pioneering firms and many laggards. Board gender diversity is very low; female directors average just 2.16%, and the median is 0, indicating most boards are male-dominated. The weighted average cost of capital (7.1%) varies moderately, reflecting differences in financing structures.
| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | p25 | Median | p75 | Max | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ln_rd | 16.348 | 1.278 | 12.793 | 15.633 | 15.745 | 17.060 | 21.160 | 522 |
| wacc | 0.071 | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.059 | 0.070 | 0.081 | 0.130 | 522 |
| esg_score | 27.633 | 16.819 | 0.851 | 13.388 | 23.830 | 38.514 | 84.236 | 522 |
| bo_size | 9.101 | 1.818 | 1 | 8 | 9 | 9.828 | 25 | 522 |
| bo_gender (%) | 2.156 | 3.828 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2.794 | 27.273 | 522 |
| lev | 0.863 | 1.103 | 0 | 0.213 | 0.566 | 1.073 | 10.523 | 522 |
| firm_size2 | 21.846 | 1.753 | 18.174 | 20.881 | 21.788 | 22.614 | 28.387 | 522 |
| ceo_bomem | 0.404 | 0.372 | 0 | 0 | 0.324 | 0.745 | 1 | 522 |
| duality | 0.072 | 0.191 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 522 |
The correlation matrix in Table 3 shows that WACC and ESG score are negatively correlated (r =–0.080), supporting H1. Firm size strongly correlates with ESG performance (r = 0.456), implying larger firms tend to invest in sustainability. This warns against interpreting ESG effects without considering firm size. Variance inflation factors are low (mean = 1.17), indicating multicollinearity isn’t an issue.
| Variable | ln_rd | wacc | esg_score | bo_size | bo_gender | lev | firm_size2 | ceo_bomem | duality | VIF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ln_rd | 1 | |||||||||
| wacc | -0.054 | 1 | 1.07 | |||||||
| esg_score | 0.287* | -0.080* | 1 | 1.31 | ||||||
| bo_size | 0.121* | -0.073 | 0.096* | 1 | 1.07 | |||||
| bo_gender | 0.031 | 0.099* | 0.118* | 0.055 | 1 | 1.04 | ||||
| lev | -0.045 | -0.125* | -0.015 | -0.076 | -0.082 | 1 | 1.07 | |||
| firm_size2 | 0.489* | -0.151* | 0.456* | 0.153* | 0.024 | -0.126* | 1 | 1.50 | ||
| ceo_bomem | 0.093* | -0.087* | -0.011 | 0.151* | 0.029 | 0.005 | 0.199* | 1 | 1.08 | |
| duality | -0.114* | 0.116* | -0.186* | -0.180* | 0.031 | 0.168* | -0.353* | -0.033 | 1 | 1.20 |
VIF: Variance inflation factors, *p < 0.05
4.2. Robustness diagnostics and endogeneity tests
Before estimating the main dynamic models, we performed diagnostics to assess the exogeneity of key regressors (WACC, ESG Score, Leverage, and Firm Size) within a fixed-effects framework. These tests serve as diagnostics and do not replace the System GMM model, which addresses dynamic endogeneity (Nickell bias). We used a manual Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation and a control function (CF) approach, employing lagged values as instruments. We evaluated instrument relevance, finding first-stage F-statistics [Table 4] for all endogenous variables well above 10, confirming their strength. However, the high values suggest potential over-fitting from numerous instruments, highlighting the need to use the collapse option in GMM estimations to prevent instrument proliferation.
| Endogenous variable | Number of excluded instruments | First-stage F-statistic | p-value | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WACC | 16 | Extremely high | 0.001 | Instruments are very strong. |
| ESG_Score | 16 | Extremely high | 0.001 | Risk of weak instruments is dismissed. |
| LEV | 16 | Extremely high | 0.001 | Instruments strongly predict leverage. |
| FIRM_SIZE2 | 16 | Extremely high | 0.001 | Instrument strength is extremely high. |
WACC: Weighted average cost of capital, ESG: Environmental, social, and governance, LEV: Leverage. p < 0.01.
We tested exogeneity using the CF approach, including first-stage regression residuals as regressors. If variables are exogenous, these residuals should be insignificant. Table 5 shows that none are significant. It is essential to clarify that, while the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (p=0.639) suggests no simultaneity bias between the regressors and the error term, it does not account for dynamic endogeneity. The presence of the lagged dependent variable (Ln(RD)t-1) in our model introduces Nickell bias, rendering standard ordinary least squares (OLS) and Fixed Effects estimators inconsistent. Therefore, despite the exogeneity indicated by static tests, the use of System GMM remains econometrically necessary to control the dynamic persistence of innovation and ensure consistent estimates.
| Variable | Coefficient | p-value | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| WACC | –2.113 | 0.607 | Negative but not significant. |
| ESG_Score | 0.0048 | 0.258 | Positive but not significant. |
| Residuals (uWACC) | 0.952 | Insignificance suggests no endogeneity for WACC. | |
| Residuals (uESG) | 0.498 | Insignificance suggests no endogeneity for ESG Score. |
WACC: Weighted average cost of capital, ESG: Environmental, social, and governance.
Notes: Coefficients from the second-stage regression of the Control Function approach. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for joint nullity of residual coefficients yields a p-value of 0.639, indicating acceptance of exogeneity.
Table 6 compares the coefficients from a manual 2SLS estimation with a standard fixed-effects OLS model. The coefficients and p-values are nearly identical across both models, confirming that, within this static framework, instrumenting the variables does not significantly alter the results.
| Variable | 2SLS coefficient (p-value) | Fixed-effects OLS coefficient (p-value) |
|---|---|---|
| WACC | –2.6374 (0.522) | –2.6374 (0.522) |
| ESG_Score | 0.0050 (0.252) | 0.0050 (0.252) |
| LEV | 0.0226 (0.717) | 0.0226 (0.717) |
| FIRM_SIZE2 | 0.1789 (0.009) | 0.1789 (0.009) |
WACC: Weighted average cost of capital, ESG: Environmental, social, and governance, OLS: Ordinary least squares.
At first glance, these results seem to challenge the need for System GMM. However, this contradiction arises from the limitations of static tests. Static tests exclude the dynamic component necessary to address Nickell bias arising from the lagged dependent variable, which is crucial for capturing innovation’s persistence. Not detecting endogeneity in a static model doesn’t mean it’s absent in the correct dynamic model. These diagnostics support our approach by demonstrating careful consideration of assumptions. System GMM remains the most robust method for our research.
4.3. Dynamic panel estimation results
Effect of sustainable commitment on the cost of capital (H1)
Table 7 shows Model 1 results. The lagged WACC coefficient of 0.829 (t=4.716) confirms cost persistence and supports a dynamic model. The ESG score has a significant negative coefficient (–0.00005). A one-standard-deviation rise in ESG (16.82 points) reduces WACC by about 0.084 percentage points, an 8.4-basis-point drop. Governance and financial variables are insignificant. Autocorrelation (p=0.563) and Hansen tests (p=0.664) show no instrument issues. These results support H1 and suggest that high-sustainability firms have lower financing costs as investors see them as less risky.
| Variable | Coefficient | t-student | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| lag_wacc | 0.8288*** | 4,716 | 0.000 |
| esg_score | -0.00005** | -2,164 | 0.035 |
| bo_size | -0.00006 | -0.233 | 0.815 |
| bo_gender | 0.00014 | 1,616 | 0.111 |
| ceo_bomem | -0.00153* | -1,694 | 0.096 |
| duality | 0.00013 | 0.041 | 0.967 |
| lev | -0.00012 | -0.223 | 0.824 |
| firm_size2 | 0.00022 | 0.709 | 0.481 |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | ||
| Constant | -0.00809 | -0.435 | 0.665 |
| Diagnostic tests | value | p-value | |
| Observations | 464 | ||
| Number of groups | 58 | ||
| Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) | z = -0.58 | 0.563 | |
| Hansen test of overid. restrictions | chi2(3) = 1.58 | 0.664 |
Two-stage system GMM estimation with Windmeijer correction; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. AR(2) (p=0.563) and Hansen (p=0.664) tests indicate the validity of the instruments.
Effect of cost of capital on innovation (H2)
Table 8 summarises Model 2 results. Innovation intensity is highly persistent, with a lagged variable coefficient of 1.283 (t=3.395). The cost of capital negatively affects R&D (β₂ = –5.894, significant at the 10% level), meaning that a 1% increase in WACC reduces R&D by 5.9%. This supports H2 and aligns with the view that higher hurdle rates decrease risky investments. Board size also negatively affects R&D (–0.0275), indicating larger boards may be more conservative. AR(2) and Hansen tests confirm the model’s validity (p>0.74).
| Variable | Coefficient | t-student | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| lag_rd | 1.2828*** | 3,395 | 0.001 |
| wacc | -5.8937* | -1,764 | 0.083 |
| bo_size | -0.02753** | -2,156 | 0.035 |
| bo_gender | -0.00419 | -0.433 | 0.667 |
| ceo_bomem | -0.05578 | -0.653 | 0.517 |
| duality | 0.00640 | 0.027 | 0.979 |
| lev | -0.06522 | -0.855 | 0.396 |
| firm_size2 | -0.17140 | -0.896 | 0.374 |
| Constant | 0.01774 | 0.008 | 0.993 |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | ||
| Diagnostic tests | value | p-value | |
| Observations | 464 | ||
| Number of groups | 58 | ||
| Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) | z = 0.01 | 0.991 | |
| Hansen test of overid. restrictions | chi2(4) = 1.94 | 0.746 |
Two-stage GMM system estimation with Windmeijer correction; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. AR(2) (p=0.991) and Hansen (p=0.746) tests indicate the validity of the instruments.
Direct effect of sustainability on innovation (H3)
Including the ESG score in the innovation equation shows a positive, significant effect (0.0117) at the 5% level, with a one-standard-deviation increase leading to an 11.7% rise in R&D. This supports H3. Firm size also positively predicts innovation, consistent with Schumpeterian theory, which holds that larger firms have greater R&D resources. Other governance factors are not significant. Model validity is confirmed by specification tests (AR (2) p=0.938; Hansen p=0.662). Results are in Table 9.
| Variable | Coefficient | t-student | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| lag_rd | 0.384** | 1,97 | 0.054 |
| esg_score | 0.0117** | 2,05 | 0.045 |
| bo_size | -0.0225 | -0.87 | 0.387 |
| bo_gender | 0.00035 | 0.03 | 0.977 |
| ceo_bomem | 0.0155 | 0.11 | 0.914 |
| duality | 0.0457 | 0.11 | 0.913 |
| lev | 0.0401 | 0.89 | 0.380 |
| firm_size2 | 0.2543*** | 2.77 | 0.008 |
| Constant | 4.2908** | 2.31 | 0.024 |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | ||
| Diagnostic tests | Value | p-value | |
| Observations | 464 | ||
| Number of groups | 58 | ||
| Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) | z = -0.08 | 0.938 | |
| Hansen test of overid. restrictions | chi2(5) = 3.24 | 0.662 |
System GMM estimation; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05. The AR(2) (p = 0.938) and Hansen (p = 0.662) tests indicate the validity of the instruments.
Mediation analysis: SEM approach
To test if the cost of capital mediates the ESG-innovation link (H4), a structural equation model with 2,000 bootstrap replications was used. The indirect path (ESG → WACC → ln(RD)) is negative (–0.00013) and not significant (p = 0.526). The direct ESG-innovation effect is positive (0.0119, p < 0.001). Since the total effect is nearly identical to the direct effect, mediation is rejected. Sustainability improves financing but doesn’t significantly influence innovation through this channel [see Table 10, Figures 2-4].
| Path | Coefficient | z-stat | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| ESG → WACC | –0.0624 | –1.57 | 0.117 |
| WACC → ln_rd | 0.0302 | 0.73 | 0.465 |
| ESG → ln_rd (direct) | 0.1641*** | 4.79 | 0.001 |
| Indirect effect (ESG → WACC → ln_rd) | –0.00014 | –0.63 | 0.526 |
| Total effect | 0.0118*** | 4.63 | 0.001 |
Standardised coefficients from SEM with bootstrap standard errors (2 000 replications). ***p < 0.01. The indirect effect is not significant, confirming the absence of mediation. WACC: Weighted average cost of capital, ESG: Environmental, social, and governance.
Notes : Standardised coefficients from SEM with bootstrap standard errors (2000 replications). The indirect effect is not significant, confirming the absence of mediation.



Robustness checks: Decomposing the cost of capital
To verify the robustness of our conclusions and deepen our understanding of the underlying financial mechanisms, we break down the cost of capital (WACC) into its two main parts: the cost of debt (c_debt) and the cost of equity (c_equity). This method allows us to evaluate whether the impact of ESG engagement, along with the related constraints on innovation, appears similarly across credit and equity markets. The results, shown in Tables 11-13, not only support our main hypotheses but also offer significant insights.
| Equation/variable | Coefficient | t-stat | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| c_debt equation | |||
| Lag of c_debt | 0.3118*** | 3.06 | 0.003 |
| ESG score | –0.000093 | –1.11 | 0.273 |
| bo_size | 0.000395 | 1.67 | 0.101 |
| bo_gender | 0.000061 | 0.65 | 0.520 |
| ceo_bomem | –0.000337 | –0.27 | 0.790 |
| duality | –0.002011 | –0.64 | 0.527 |
| lev | 0.002018*** | 4.65 | 0.001 |
| firm_size2 | 0.000575 | 1.00 | 0.322 |
| Constant | 4.2908** | 2.31 | 0.024 |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | ||
| Diagnostic tests | Value | p-value | |
| Observations | 464 | ||
| Number of groups | 58 | ||
| Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) | z = 0.58 | 0.564 | |
| Hansen test of overid. restrictions | chi2(6) = 1.32 | 0.970 | |
| ln_rd equation | |||
| Lagln_rd | 0.3502* | 1.82 | 0.074 |
| c_debt | –7.3543** | –2.27 | 0.027 |
| bo_size | –0.0196 | –0.95 | 0.347 |
| bo_gender | 0.0089 | 0.75 | 0.457 |
| ceo_bomem | –0.0082 | –0.06 | 0.954 |
| duality | 0.1003 | 0.30 | 0.768 |
| lev | 0.0798 | 1.45 | 0.154 |
| firm_size2 | 0.3215*** | 3.32 | 0.002 |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | ||
| Diagnostic tests | Value | p-value | |
| Observations | 464 | ||
| Number of groups | 58 | ||
| Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) | z = -0.17 | 0.868 | |
| Hansen test of overid. restrictions | chi2(6) = 2.88 | 0.237 |
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Notes: System GMM estimation for the cost of debt and R&D with two-step robust errors. Lev increases c_debt, but ESG does not. A higher cost of debt reduces R&D.
| Equation/variable | Coefficient | t-stat | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| c_equity equation | |||
| Lagc_equity | 0.8185*** | 7.28 | 0.000 |
| ESG_Score | –0.000064** | –2.19 | 0.033 |
| bo_size | –0.000159 | –0.67 | 0.508 |
| bo_gender | 0.000220** | 2.39 | 0.020 |
| ceo_bomem | –0.002225* | –1.91 | 0.061 |
| duality | 0.001961 | 0.52 | 0.606 |
| lev | 0.000857* | 1.79 | 0.079 |
| firm_size2 | 0.000153 | 0.41 | 0.680 |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | ||
| Diagnostic tests | Value | p-value | |
| Observations | 464 | ||
| Number of groups | 58 | ||
| Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) | z = -0.02 | 0.985 | |
| Hansen test of overid. restrictions | chi2() = 0.01 | 0.976 | |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | ||
| ln_rd equation | |||
| Lag de ln_rd | 0.3445*** | 2.68 | 0.010 |
| c_equity | 8.7269* | 1.82 | 0.074 |
| bo_size | –0.0090 | –0.32 | 0.754 |
| bo_gender | –0.0029 | –0.19 | 0.849 |
| ceo_bomem | –0.0014 | –0.01 | 0.991 |
| duality | –0.2026 | –0.47 | 0.640 |
| lev | 0.0416 | 1.17 | 0.245 |
| firm_size2 | 0.3277*** | 4.47 | 0.001 |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | ||
| Diagnostic tests | Value | p-value | |
| Observations | 464 | ||
| Number of groups | 58 | ||
| Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) | z = 0.18 | 0.857 | |
| Hansen test of overid. restrictions | chi2(6) = 4.67 | 0.458 | |
| Year fixed effects | Yes |
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Notes: System GMM estimation for cost of equity and R&D. ESG significantly reduces c_equity; a higher c_equity has a weakly positive effect on R&D (p < 0.10). Other governance variables are mostly insignificant.
| Mediator | Indirect effect | Direct effect | Total effect | Significance of indirect |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| c_debt | 0.00018 | 0.01083 | 0.01101 | (p = 0.406) |
| c_equity | 0.00003 | 0.01098 | 0.01101 | (p = 0.953) |
Notes: Derived from SEM using c_debt and c_equity as mediators. The indirect effects are not significant; the direct effects are similar to the baseline, confirming the robustness of the main findings.
Evidence from the cost of debt
The analysis [Table 11] shows ESG scores do not significantly affect debt costs (p = 0.273). During the sample period, Saudi creditors, banks, and bondholders did not reward good ESG performance with better terms. Several factors explain this pattern. Creditors, with shorter outlooks than equity investors, focus more on traditional default indicators, such as leverage, which is significant in our model, rather than ESG metrics, which are seen as more intangible. Also, many large firms receive implicit state support, so lenders’ risk perception may be less influenced by sustainability factors. Second, consistent with H2, the cost of debt significantly impacts R&D spending (β = –7.354, p = 0.027), more strongly than WACC. Stricter credit standards and higher interest rates limit firms’ riskier, long-term investments, such as R&D.
Evidence from the cost of equity
The cost of equity analysis [Table 12] shows a consistent pattern: the ESG score significantly negatively affects the cost of equity (β = –0.000064, p = 0.033). This indicates that sustainability positively affects the overall cost of capital and is reflected in equity markets. Equity investors, as long-term residual claimants, view ESG performance as a sign of good management, resilience, and control over non-financial risks, such as regulatory, reputational, and climate risks. They accept lower risk premiums for sustainable companies, thereby reducing WACC.
We observe a weak positive and marginal relationship between the cost of equity and innovation (β = 8.727, p = 0.074). This does not mean that higher equity costs cause more innovation, but rather likely reflects risk-induced correlation: firms investing heavily in R&D tend to have higher, more uncertain growth profiles. Equity markets price this risk by charging higher expected returns, thereby raising the cost of equity. This positive correlation does not conflict with H2 but highlights the complexity of how investors perceive innovation risk.
Robustness of the non-mediation result
Table 13 confirms our main conclusion: no mediation (rejecting H4). The indirect ESG effect on innovation is insignificant (p = 0.406 for debt; p = 0.953 for equity). The direct ESG effect on innovation remains positive, similar to the baseline model, and highly significant.
5. DISCUSSION
5.1. ESG engagement and the cost of capital: Confirmation of a risk reduction channel
Our results support hypothesis H1, showing that high ESG scores significantly reduce Saudi firms’ cost of capital. A one-standard-deviation increase in ESG lowers WACC by about 8.4 basis points, indicating that investors value ESG even in emerging markets. This rewards sustainable firms with better financing, consistent with international studies.6,8,9
This relationship is driven by a risk-reduction mechanism supported by theoretical frameworks. Consistent with signalling theory, transparent ESG performance signals managerial quality and long-term vision, reducing information asymmetry in an often high-uncertainty market. Studies in China show that environmental disclosure, voluntary or mandatory, lowers equity capital costs.16,17 Legitimacy and institutional theories explain that, under Vision 2030, a high ESG score aligns with national goals, enhances legitimacy, and reduces the perceived risks of sanctions or contract losses, especially in the materials and energy sectors in our sample.
Our findings support the ESG risk mitigation view over agency theory’s overinvestment hypothesis. Saudi investors see ESG spending as prudent management of climate, regulatory, and reputational risks, as well as to stabilise cash flows and lower required returns. Robustness tests show the cost of equity drives this benefit, while debt remains unaffected by ESG performance. This indicates a maturity gap: shareholders incorporate ESG risks, but creditors focus on traditional metrics, possibly reassured by state support. Improving ESG data quality and assurance could bridge this gap, aided by higher audit standards.
5.2. The cost of capital as a constraint to innovation
Consistent with hypothesis H2, our analysis confirms that the cost of capital is a significant constraint on Saudi firms’ innovation. The negative, significant coefficient of WACC on R&D expenditures (β = –5.894, p<0.10) indicates that a 1% increase in WACC is associated with a 5.9% decrease in R&D spending. This aligns with corporate finance principles: a higher cost of capital, as a “hurdle rate,” makes risky, long-term R&D projects less likely to have a positive NPV. This supports literature showing financial constraints hinder innovation.32,33,44.
Our robustness tests, which decompose the cost of capital, confirm and refine this conclusion. The effect is more substantial for the cost of debt, indicating that creditor constraints emphasising cash flow security heavily influence R&D investments in high-uncertainty environments. Interestingly, we observe a weak positive relationship between the cost of equity and innovation. While this appears to contrast with the ‘hurdle rate’ logic of Hypothesis 2, it is consistent with the risk-return trade-off fundamental to equity markets. Innovation is inherently risky; firms with high R&D intensity often exhibit more volatile future cash flows. Consequently, equity investors, as residual claimants, demand a higher risk premium for these innovative firms. This suggests that while debt markets (WACC) act as a constraint on innovation, the equity market reflects the higher risk profile associated with aggressive R&D strategies, as discussed by Zheng et al.45.
Despite this anomaly, the negative impact of WACC and debt costs clearly shows that tighter financing conditions hamper Saudi firms’ innovation. Peia and Romelli46 agree, noting that moderate financial tightening might paradoxically boost innovation efficiency by encouraging firms to focus on strategic projects.
5.3. The strategic dividend of sustainability: A direct catalyst for innovation
Our study confirms a strong positive link between a firm’s sustainability commitment and its innovation capacity, supporting hypothesis H3. The ESG score positively impacts R&D spending (0.0117, p = 0.045). A one-standard-deviation increase in ESG correlates with about a 11.7% rise in R&D. For Saudi firms, ESG engagement drives strategic renewal and capability development, not just reporting or compliance.
This “strategic dividend” of sustainability is explained by resource- and capability-based theories. The resource based view says that sustainability pushes firms to develop unique resources, such as eco-design and circular-economy management, thereby aiding innovation. The dynamic capabilities framework adds that pressures such as Vision 2030 and the global shift to sustainability prompt firms to identify trends, reallocate resources, and transform business models. This ongoing adaptation and learning drive innovation.
Our results validate the “Porter hypothesis” in a non-Western, resource-dependent economy. They support literature showing that sustainability spurs new business models in sectors such as mining,60 encourages sustainable innovation along global value chains,23 and drives the blue economy.25 Our findings confirm that green innovation is vital for sustainable development in high-polluting firms, which are dominant in our sample and are consistent with other industrialising economies.45,61
5.4. The absence of mediation: The primacy of the strategic channel over the financial channel
The study’s key contribution is rejecting the mediation hypothesis (H4). While ESG reduces the cost of capital (H1) and facilitates innovation (H2), the indirect path is not statistically significant (p=0.526). The direct ESG-innovation effect remains large and significant (p<0.001). Our robustness tests confirm this, leading to the conclusion that, during Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia, innovation driven by sustainability pressures is a stronger motivator than financial relief. Several factors rooted in the Saudi context explain the dominance of this strategic channel. First, institutional pressures, notably Vision 2030’s top-down push, create a crucial need for large firms to diversify and decarbonise. This coercive and normative pressure makes innovation vital for long-term survival and legitimacy. Firms innovate because their environment and license to operate require it, not just because capital is cheaper.
Second, statistical significance differs from economic relevance. An 8.4 basis-point reduction in WACC is a real financial benefit but may not strongly influence investment in large, transformative R&D projects. The strategic long-term benefits, such as ensuring future viability and political legitimacy, likely outweigh the marginal savings. Third, the firm’s financing, often from internal cash flows, may lessen the impact of external capital cost changes, like those reflected in the WACC. This challenges the assumption that ESG value is mainly financial. It shows that the strategic channel, based on developing internal capabilities, is dominant. Financial constraints matter, but are not the main pathway for ESG’s influence on innovation here. This suggests the need for more nuanced models considering parallel pathways.
6. CONCLUSION
This study analysed the triangular relationship among ESG performance, the cost of capital, and firm innovation, testing the mediating role of the financial channel in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. Using a system GMM to address endogeneity, our results led to a nuanced, counterintuitive conclusion.
Our results confirm conventional wisdom: higher ESG performance reduces capital costs and constrains R&D investments. We find a strong, direct positive link between ESG and innovation. However, we reject the mediation hypothesis, as the indirect financial channel via lower capital costs is statistically insignificant. This highlights the dominance of a direct strategic channel, driven by Vision 2030 pressures, making innovation vital for legitimacy and survival, outweighing financial gains.
The research provides actionable insights for stakeholders in finance, strategy, and sustainability. Managers should see ESG as a strategic renewal tool, focusing on initiatives such as clean tech and transparent governance that foster innovation and competitiveness amid changing markets. Policymakers find that intense institutional pressure, such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, effectively drives corporate transformation but highlight a policy gap: the Saudi credit market’s low ESG sensitivity, which requires initiatives to enhance banks’ climate risk assessment, ESG disclosure, supervision, and green bonds. For investors, the study shows a significant difference in ESG integration across asset classes. Saudi equity investors effectively price ESG benefits, but credit investors and lenders may overlook non-financial risks, providing an opportunity for fixed-income and engagement-focused strategies to improve risk models and drive sustainability in financing.
Our study has limitations, opening avenues for future research. These include using an input indicator for innovation (R&D expenditure), a composite ESG score, and the context-specificity of our findings. Future research could use output measures (e.g., patents), disaggregate ‘E’, ‘S’, and ‘G’ pillars to analyse their effects, and conduct comparative studies in other emerging economies to test generalisability. This thesis aims to shed new, contextually rich light on how sustainability creates value by untangling the complex links between sustainability, finance, and innovation.
Ethical approval
Institutional Review Board approval is not required.
Declaration of patient consent
Patient’s consent not required as there are no patients in this study.
Financial support and sponsorship
Nil.
Conflicts of interest
There are no conflicts of interest.
Use of artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted technology for manuscript preparation
The authors confirm that there was no use of artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted technology for assisting in the writing or editing of the manuscript and no images were manipulated using AI.
References
- Corporate social responsibility versus corporate shareholder responsibility: A family firm perspective. J Corp Finance. 2020;61:101370.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Marshfield (MA): Pitman; 1984.
- Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. J Account Econ. 2001;31:405-40.
- [Google Scholar]
- Effect of ESG performance on the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China. Int Rev Econ & Finance. 2023;83:348-64.
- [CrossRef] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
- Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of capital? J Bank & Financ. 2011;35:2388-406.
- [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
- Do investors value corporate sustainability structures? Evidence from the cost of equity capital. Finance Res Lett. 2025;85:108207.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- ESG ratings and the cost of equity capital in China. Energy Econ. 2024;136:107685.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Impact of CSR on cost of debt and cost of capital: Australian evidence. SRJ. 2020;16:419-30.
- [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
- Corporate social responsibility as a conflict between shareholders. J Bus Ethics. 2010;97:71-86.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. J Financ Econ. 1976;3:305-60.
- [Google Scholar]
- Carbon risk and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China. Int Rev Econ & Finance. 2025;99:103975.
- [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
- The price of realized extreme climate events in the implied cost of equity capital: International evidence. J Bank & Finance. 2025;180:107525.
- [CrossRef] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
- Firm-level climate sentiments, climate politics and implied cost of equity capital. J Corp Finance. 2025;94:102846.
- [Google Scholar]
- Impact of mandatory environmental information disclosure on the capital cost: Evidence from listed companies in China. Heliyon. 2024;10:e40045.
- [CrossRef] [PubMed] [PubMed Central] [Google Scholar]
- Voluntary environmental regulation policies and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China’s “Green Factory” policy. Res Int Bus Fin. 2025;79:103092.
- [Google Scholar]
- Corporate social responsibility and innovation: A resource‐based theory. Manag Decis. 2011;49:1709-27.
- [Google Scholar]
- Sustainable business model innovation: A review. J Cleaner Prod. 2018;198:401-16.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- The challenge of introducing sustainability‐oriented innovation—An ethnographic study. Sustainable Development. 2025;33:4191-203.
- [Google Scholar]
- A natural-resource-based view of the firm. The academy of management review. 1995;20:986.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Explicating dynamic capabilities: The nature and micro foundations of (sustainable) enterprise performance. Strateg Manag J. 2007;28:1319-50.
- [Google Scholar]
- Does global value chains foster sustainable technological innovation? A multifaceted analysis of belt and road economies. Sustainable Futures. 2025;10:101322.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Antecedent configurations of green innovation and corporate sustainable development performance evidence from chinese heavy-polluting enterprises. Sustain Futures. 2025;10:101343.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Waves of innovation: The role of sustainability in driving impact in the blue economy – A PLS-SEM approach. Marine Policy. 2026;183:106902.
- [Google Scholar]
- Saudi Vision 2030. Vision 2030: Pillars, programs and overview. Government of Saudi Arabia; 2016. Available from: https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/overview.
- Capital Market Authority (CMA). The role of governance reforms and ESG disclosure in the Saudi capital market. Riyadh: Capital Market Authority; 2023.
- Public Investment Fund (PIF). Green Finance Framework. Riyadh: Public Investment Fund; 2024. Available from: https://www.pif.gov.sa.
- Reuters. Saudi Power Procurement Company signs deals for three solar projects. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-power-procurement-company-signs-deals-three-solar-projects-2024-06-27/. [Last accessed 2024 June 27]
- Saudi Vision 2030. National Investment Strategy (NIS). Government of Saudi Arabia; 2021. Available from: https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/overview.
- Saudi Vision 2030. Saudi Green Initiative: 2030/2060 targets, emission reductions and renewable energy. Government of Saudi Arabia; 2021. Available from: https://www.vision2030.gov.sa.
- The financing of R&D and innovation. In: Hall BH, Rosenberg N, eds. Handbook of the Economics of Innovation. Vol 1. 2010. p. :609-39.
- [Google Scholar]
- The impact of human resources information systems on individual innovation capability in Tunisian companies: The moderating role of affective commitment. Eur Res Manag Bus Econ. 2020;26:18-25.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Acad Manage Rev. 1995;20:571-610.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- The legitimising effect of social and environmental disclosures: A theoretical foundation. Account Audit Account J. 2002;15:282-311.
- [Google Scholar]
- Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics. Acad Manage Rev. 1995;20:404-37.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- CSR investments and innovation – Aligning and creating shared value. J Cleaner Prod. 2024;481:144189.
- [Google Scholar]
- Impact of ESG performance on the cost of capital in the energy, utilities, and basic materials sectors. Util Policy. 2025;97:102016.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Environmental externalities and cost of capital. Manage Sci. 2014;60:2223-47.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- The impact of institutional investors’ ESG concerns on corporate ESG disclosure: Evidence from site visits. Finance Res Lett. 2025;76:106957.
- [Google Scholar]
- Determinants of corporate social and environmental voluntary disclosure in Saudi listed firms. JFRA. 2022;20:667-92.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Finance and corporate innovation: A survey. Asia-Pac J of Fin Stud. 2018;47:165-212.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Corporate innovation’s impact on the cost of equity: Evidence from Chinese listed companies. J Clean Prod. 2025;486:144430.
- [Google Scholar]
- Did financial frictions stifle R&D investment in Europe during the great recession? J Int Money Finance. 2022;120:102263.
- [Google Scholar]
- Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. J Manage. 1991;17:99-120.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- A contingent resource-based view of proactive corporate environmental strategy. Acad Manage Rev. 2003;28:71-88.
- [Google Scholar]
- The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. Am Sociol Rev. 1983;48:147-60.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica. 1981;49:1417.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. J Econom. 1995;68:29-51.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. J Econom. 1998;87:115-43.
- [Google Scholar]
- Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Rev Econ Stud. 1991;58:277-97.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators. J Econ. 2005;126:25-51.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- How to do Xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. The Stata Journal: Promoting communications on statistics and Stata. 2009;9:86-136.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxf Bull Econ Stat. 2009;71:135-58.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- The estimation of economic relationships using instrumental variables. Econometrica. 1958;26:393-415.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators. Econometrica. 1982;50:1029-54.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1986;51:1173-82.
- [CrossRef] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
- Impact of sustainable business model innovation and green competencies on business sustainability in the mining sector: Moderating role of green creativity. Extr Ind Soc. 2026;25:101784.
- [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- The impact of carbon emission trading system on the implied cost of equity capital. Int Rev Econ & Finance. 2025;101:104157.
- [CrossRef] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
